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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

No. 8533

ALBERT EDMUND BARLOW,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Albert Edmund Barlow was on the 31st day of
October, 1955, in Salt Lake County, Utah, charged with
the crime of unlawful cohabitation in that in Salt Lake
County, between April 30, 1952, and October 31, 1955,
"the said Albert Edmund Barlow, at the time and
place aforesaid did unlawfully cohabit with more
than one person of the opposite sex, to-wit:
Maureen Owen, Amanda Kate Kilgrow, Vio
Frazer". (R. 16)
The defendant was bound over for trial upon waiver
of preliminary hearing (R. 1), and dJfendant appeared
for arraignment December 23, 1955 (R. 17). On Decem-
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ber 31, 1955, defendant demanded a bill of particulars
(R. 19-20), which was furnished (R. 23-24), together with
an amended information (R. 21-22), on the 13th day of
January, 1956. Defendant filed a motion to quash (R.
25-26) on four grounds on the 14th day of January, 1956,
which was heard on the 19th day of January, 1956, and
denied by the court. Defendant on the 21st day of Janary, 1956, entered a plea of not guilty (R. 29). The case
came on for hearing before a jury on the 12th day of
March, 1956.
During the impan~lling of the jury the court denied
a motion of the State to strike Juror McMurrin on the
basis of .admitted prejudice (R. 47 -48) and a motion of
defendant to strike Juror Ohran for cause on the basis
that he had predetermined the defendant's marital status,
an essential element of the case (R. 51-53). The court
further denied defendant's motion to discharge the jury
on the district attorney's voir dire ·as to plural marriage
(R. 5±) and the district attorney's reference to the three
women named in the information as defendant's "wives"
(R. 50-51). The court further refused to strike for cause
Juror Nelson on the ground that his employment arose
directly from the L.D.S. Church (R. 61) and denied defendant's challenge to the panel on the basis that ten of
the twelve were of the L.D.S. faith (R. 62).
The c.ase proceeded to trial after both the defendant
and the State had exhausted their preemptory challenges.
The State proceeded to put on its evidence, and at 2 :00
p. m. on March 13, 1956, the defense rested.
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The court released the jury for thirty minutes without supervision after all the evidence was in, prior to
instructions. Defendant requested Instructions Nos. 1 to
6 inclusive (R. 2'45-252). Defendant excepted to the
court's refusal to give requested Instruction No. 1 (R ..
246). The court gave its instructions covering the offense, together with stock instructions (R. 253-262). The
court thereafter modified Instructions Nos. 3, 5 and 10
(R. 234-235). The defendant excepted to the court's
Instructions Nos. 3, 5 and 10 and the modification
thereof (R. 235-236). The State excepted to Instructions
Nos. 6 and 10. Arguments were presented, the jury retired and returned a verdict of guilty. Defendant was
sentenced by the court for an indefinite period not to
exceed five years in the State prison.
Within the time provided by law, defendant appealed
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Albert Ed1nund Barlow married ICate Kilgrow
(Amanda Kate Barlow) on October 23, 1922 (R. 69 and
Exhibit 1), said marriage resulting in several children.
Thereafter he lived with and had issue by Maurine Owen
and Vio Fraser, the evidence not showing the beginning
dates of either relationship. Barlow was convicted of
unlawful cohabitation with these three women in May,
1944, and sentenced thereon in 1945 (R. 74). At the time
of his release from the Utah State prison on parole
Barlow was informed by the parole Loard that he was
under the duty to support and maintain his children (R.
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260). At all times after Barlow's release, the three families lived in separate and widely segregated homes. Amanda Kate Barlow lived at 25 West 6025 South, Murray,
Utah, in Salt Lake County (R. 78), and at Bluebell,
Duchesne County (R. 221). Vio Fraser lived at 50 Granite Avenue, Salt Lake County (R. 195), and in Mountain
Home, Duchesne County (R. 199). Maurine Owen lived
at 1538 South 3d East, Salt Lake City and County, during
the entire period (R. 183).
Several witnesses had seen Barlow around each of
the three homes at intervals during the period in which
the crime is charged. With regard to 25 West 6025 South,
see the testimony of Bruce Andreasen (R. 75-86), Shirley
Broadbent (R. 86-95), David Eccles (R. 95-101), Alhona
Barlow (R. 102-109), and David W. Barlow (R. 110-119).
With regard to 1538 South 3d East, see testimony of
Evelyn Clampitt (R. 126-144), and Annie :\I. Roll (R.159166), Sarah Arpin (R. 166-169), and Edmund Barlow
(R. 170-176). With regard to 50 Granite Avenue, see
testimony of Vio Fraser (R. 194-200) and David \Y.
Barlow (R. 110-119).
The testimony of the witnesses showed Barlow at
each of the places at various times helping care for the
premises, controlling the children, and on occasion bringing groceries and supplies to the houses. With respect
to 1538 South 3d East, the testimony of Evelyn Clampitt
indicates Barlow dined there on occasion.
The State produced 27 birth certificates, which were
entered with two exceptions, upon the withdrawal of
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objection as to materiality by the defendant. Only two
of these birth certificates concerned children born or
conceived within the period charged in the information,
both of these children being born to :Maurine Owen.
The testimony of several witnesses, including David
W. Barlow, Arlene Mitchell and Vio Fraser, showed the
defendant and at least two of the women with whom he is
accused of having cohabited, to-wit, Amanda Kate Barlow
and Vio Fraser, to have lived in Duchesne County during
a portion of the time charged in the information and in
different places in Duchesne County.
The court allowed, over defendant's objection, a
plethora of hearsay testimony by witnesses consisting
of neighbors of the three abodes in Salt Lake County
regarding statements made to them or overheard by
them from the children and alleged cohabitees with the
defendant and out of the presence of the defendant.
The evidence shows beyond any doubt that the
defendant continued after his former conviction to care
for, maintain, support and educate his children, but there
is no evidence of cohabitation or holding the three women
set forth in the information out as wives during the
period charged in the information.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I

The court erred in denying defendant's motion to
quash and more particularly Paragraph 1:
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"The information does not charge the defendant with
the commission of an offense,"
and Paragraph 3:
"That there is more than one offense charged, except
as provided in Section 77-21-31, U. C. A., 1953, to-wit:
'a. Cohabiting with Maurine Owen and Kate Kilgrow during the period .alleged in the information.
'b. Cohabiting with Maurine Owen and Vio Frazer
during the same period.
'c. Cohabiting with Vio Frazer and Kate Kilgrow
during the same period.' "
II.
The court erred in allowing in evidence facts outside
of the period charged in the information.
III.
The court erred in allowing m evidence hearsay
statements .and conclusions arising from conversations
not in the presence of the defendant.
IV.
The court erred in giving Instruction No. :2, in that
said intruction, together with other instructions, does not
inform the jury of the ele1nents of the crime charged.

v.
The court erred in giving Instruction No. 5, in that
it is ambiguous, entirely negative, and construed together
I
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
with Instruction No. 2 tends to confuse the jury.
VI.
The court erred in failing to define the word, "cohabitation," to the jury.
VII.
The court erred in denying defendant's challenge for
cause to Juror Ohran.
VIII.
The evidence, in view of the instructions, is insufficient to show cohabitation between defendant and any
two of the women charged during the period set forth
in the information.
IX.

The court erred in amending Instructions Nos. 3, 5
and 10 after the original submission to the jury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO QUASH, AND MORE PARTICULARLY PARAGRAPH 1 THEREOF, THAT THE INFORMATION DOES
NOT CHARGE THE DEFENDANT WITH THE COMMISSION
OF AN OFFENSE, AND PARAGRAPH 3, THAT THERE IS
MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE CHARGED. (Assignment of
Error Nos. 1 and 9).
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.

Said errors will be discussed separately.
A.

The infonnation does not charge an offense in that
the statute, Section 76-53-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
is so ambiguous and uncertain that it does not inform
the public as to the crime it charges, nor advise the
court in directing the trial of the matter. It is in violation of defendant's constitutional rights under Amendments V and XIV of the Constitution of the United
States. The ambiguity arises from 1he entire lack of
a time factor.
The section so far as is applicable to this point reads
as follows:
"If any person cohabits with more than one
person of the opposite sex, such person is guilty
of a felony."
This court has from 1896 to the present date given
Inany and varied definitions of the word, "cohabit," as
used in this law, the sum and substance of them being
to the effect that "cohabit" was intended by the legislature for the purpose of this legislation to come under
the second dictionary definition of that word, i.e., "to
live together as man and wife; or ostensibly to hold one
of the opposite sex out to the world as one's spouse.~'

U. 8. vs. Gannon, 4 U. 122, 7 P. 369;
U. 8. vs. Snow, 4 U. 295, 9 P. 686;
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State vs. Jessup, 98 U. 482, 100 P(2) 969;
State vs. Barlow, 107 U. 292, 153 P(2) 647;
U. S. vs. White, 4 U. 500, 11 P. 570.
Nowhere in the law itself is a time factor considered.
There is nothing in the title nor in the body of the law
to connote the necessity of cohabitation with more than
one person of the opposite sex simultaneously or within
a reasonable period of time; in fact, the only legislation
putting a time factor to this section is the omnibus
limitation of actions as to felonies, which makes a limitation on prosecution of felonies not otherwise enumerated
of four years.
Let us ask: Is the person who divorces his or her
spouse and then marries again within four years after
living with the first spouse guilty of a felony~ He or
she is not guilty of polygamy as the first marriage is
ended in law prior to entering into the second, but is
he or she not guilty of a violation of Section 76-53-2 ~ And
what of the widow or widower who seeks solace or financial security by a second marriage within the felony
limitation period following the demise of the former
spouse~ Is he or she not subject to prosecution both
unwittingly and unknowingly~
This line of reasoning has theretofore been pondered
by this court in State vs. Jessup, 98 U. 482, 100 P(2') 969,
another Utah unlawful cohabitation case, wherein this
court on page 971 states :
"The definition of cohabitation given by our
statute is so general that to limit the information
to it, word for word, states no more than a class
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of crimes. In fact, it is gravely questionable
whether the statute states the offense it was intended to cover. It would appear that some attention should have been given to the element of time.
If a man marries and lives with a second wife
after the death of, or divorce from, his first, he
falls within the definition of the statute; yet all
must concede that it was not the intention of the
Legislature to make such relationships the bases
of criminal offenses."
The defendant in the instant case was found guilty
under this same statute in 1944 (R. 215-217), and it is
apparent by the finding of the jury that his efforts to
support his children show a continuity of a holding out
of three ostensible marital relationships ad infinitum,
or at least until the children of at least two of the families
are reared and no longer living with their mother.
The court, in State vs . .Jiusser, ------------ U. ____________ , 223
P(2) 193, quoting Justice Jackson in ~fusser et al. vs.
State of Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 68 Sup. Ct. 397, 92 L. ed. 562
states:
"Legislation nwy run afoul of the due process
clause because it fails to gi,~e adequate guidance
to those who would be law-abiding to advise defendants of the nature of the offense "ith which
they are charged or to guide courts in trying those
who .are accused."
In that case also, the 1natter arising from an unlawful cohabitation and teaching of polygmny situation,
the court held that our conspiracy law. Section 76-11-1(5),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, was void for vagueness
and uncertainty, and that it did not inform people
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under the jurisdiction of that law as to what constituted
the crime of conspiracy. The instant statute would
appear to be even more vague and uncertain in that it
in no way whatsoever informs the public nor any of them
as to the time element, if any, intended by the legislature
during which a person could hold out only one person
of the opposit e sex to be his spouse.
1

The question would appear to be whether the statute
is so vague and ambiguous and indefinite that it fails to
define the offense attempted to be charged, and to give
reasonable standardR for determining by the publie
the nature of the crime they are prohibited from
violating, and by the court ,as a guide for determination
of guilt. Can it be said in view of the wording of Section
76-53-2 that a person living with one person of the
opposite sex in 1952 and with another in 1955 is not
guilty of an offense, while a person, regardless of marital
status, who holds one person of the opposite sex out
to be his or her spouse in January of a given year and
holds ,another out as his or her spouse in December of
the same year is guilty? l\fust the cohabitation be simultaneous, concurrent, or is a holding out to the world of
two persons as spouses sufficient any time within the
four-year limitation period whether concurrent, within a
short period of time, or separated by three years and
eleven months 1 The statute gives no guide or limitation
whatsoever.

B.
Defendant further contends ti~at the amended
information (R. 21-22) and the bill of particulars (R. 23-
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24) charge the defendant in one count with the commission of three separate and distinct crimes, to-wit:
a. Cohabiting during the period charged with
Amanda Kate Barlow and Maurine Owen;
b. Cohabiting during the period charged with
Amanda Kate Barlow and Vio Fraser;
c. Cohabiting during the period charged with
Maurine Owen and Vio Fraser.
And the court by its amendments to Instruction No.
3, subparagraph 1:
"That on and between April30, 1952, and the
31st day of October, 1955, Albert Edmund Barlow
did cohabit with more than one person of the
opposite sex, to-wit, with any two or more of the
following: Maurine Owen, Amanda Kate Kilgrow, and Vio Fraser" (R. 234 and 254),
and Instruction No. 10 (R. 258), where the court amended
the instruction by adding, ••any two or more of the
three women," to the original instruction, thereby literally and concisely instructing the jury that it need not
find the defendant guilty of cohabiting with three women
as charged in the information, but of cohabiting with any
two of said three.
The court further in its verdict (R. 261-262) does
not set out guilty of cohabiting with A and B, A and C, or
B and C, but 1nerely guilty as charged, or, in the alternative, not guilty, thereby affirn1ing defendant's contention
on his motion to quash that there is more than one
crime charged.
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This is in effect a method of procedure wherein the
State charges: "We accuse the defendant of breaking
the law by cohabiting with A, B, and C, etc. We do not
know which of the women he cohabited with, but if we
prove to your satisfaction that he cohabited with any
two of the women set forth in the information during the
three years period charged (and that cohabitation need
not cover the same period), you may find him guilty as
charged."
Section 77-21-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, entitled
"Joinder of Offenses," states:
"The information or indictment must charge
but one offense, but the same offense may be set
forth in different forms under different counts;
and when the offense may be committed by the
use of different means, the means may be alleged
in the alternative in the same count; provided, that
an information or indictment for larceny may contain also a count for obtaining money by false pretenses, a count for embezzlement, and .a count
for receiving or buying stolen property, knowing
it to be stolen; that an information or indictment
for forgery may contain .a count for uttering a
forged instrument, knowing it to be a forgery;
that an information or indictment for rohbery may
contain a count for larceny; that an information
or indictment for burglary may contain a count
for housebreaking and one for larceny, and an
information or indictment for housebreaking may
contain a count for larceny; that an information
or indictment for rape may contain a count for
carnal knowledge of a female under eighteen years
of age, and that an information or indictment for
rape or assault with intent to commit r.ape, or
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carnal knowledge of a female under eighteen years
of age, or attempt to commit the crime of carnal
knowledge of a female under eighteen years of
age, or crime against nature upon .any person, or
attempt to commit the crime against nature upon
any person, may contain also a count for indecent
assault."
It will be noted that the situation at hand does not
come within the exceptions listed supra nor is the
information drawn in more than one count. In State vs.
Jensen, 74 U. 527, 536, 280 P. 1046, this court goes so far
as to hold:
"Under this section, where two or more
offenses arise from the same transaction, each
punishable as a separate crime, whether all arise
from a single act or from successive parts of a
whole transaction, they cannot be joined unless
permitted by an exception to the prohibition
against uniting the offenses or unless they bear
the relation of a lesser involved to a greater
offense, or the component parts of the crime
sought to be charged are themselves crimes."
The situation in the instant case purporting to arise
from various transactions connected only b~~ the alleged
presence of the defendant at each transaction must constitute three possible criines, .and all transactions are set
forth in one count in the infor1nation in distinct violation
of Section 77-21-31.
It is plain that under the infonnation in the instant
case upon such a finding the jur~~, if there had been
proper evidence, could haYe detern1ined that the defendant cohabited with one of the w01nen without cohabitation
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with either one of the other two of the women, or that
he cohabited with any two of the women with the third
not being necessary to the c.ase at all. The question arises
in one's mind after a thorough reading of the information
and the instructions of the court, did the jury find
Albert Edmund Barlow guilty of cohabiting with all
three of the women in the information or with only two
of them, and, if so, which two~
The writer urges that the information contains a
joinder expressly prohibited by Section 77-21-31, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, and that the court's denial of
defendant's motion to quash was reversible error.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE TO JUROR OHRAN. (Assignment
of Error No. 7).

In questioning the jury panel on voir dire, Juror
Ohran stated he was acquainted with the defendant and
defendant had worked for him (R. 39). Later on voir
dire on the district attorney's questioning of Juror Ohran
regarding his knowledge of defendant and his family life,
Juror Ohran by his answers explicitly admitted a preconceived opinion as to defendant's marital status:
"MR. ANDERSON: Further, Your Honor,
I would like know whether or not Mr. Ohran who
apparently has had some acquaintance with the
defendant, during that acquaintance became familiar with any of the circumstances relating to Mr.
Barlow and his family life that might in any way
affect his judgment, one way or the other~
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"MR. ORRAN: No, I didn't know at that
time. Since that time and I guess I have been a
little .acquainted with it we have had a girl who
is in a similar circumstance work for us and talked
about it" (R. 51).
On the basis of this answer, defendant challenged for
cause on the ground of preconceived opinion. The following questions and answers followed:
"THE COURT: Mr. Ohran, do you have any
knowledge that you would act upon in the trial of
this matter, independent from what the evidence
might or might not show~
"MR. ORRAN: No. I stated I would judge it
on the weight of the evidence, but I do have that
knowledge of several people.
"THE COURT: Whatever knowledge you
have in reference to Mr. Barlow is through hearsay and gossip that you may have heard~
"MR. ORRAN: And what I have read in the
papers.
"THE COURT: And what you have read
in the papers~
"MR. ORRAN: Yes.
"THE COURT: And at this time do you still
indulge, so far as he is concerned, in the presumption of innocence and presun1e that he is innocent
until he would be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt~
.. 1\fH. OHRAN: Oh, I think I would.

"THE COURT: Well, I mean is your feeling
towards l\Ir. Barlow at this time that he is preSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sumed innocent until he is proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt~
"MR. ORRAN: Yes. I would judge that.
"MR. HATCH: I would ask the Court to ask
Mr. Ohran if prior to this time he has formed an
opinion as to Mr. Barlow's present marital status~
"MR. ORRAN: No. Just what has been in
the paper. I think every informed person in reading it they assume that there is something connected to it.
"THE COURT: Well, Mr. Ohran, you have
served as a juror here many times, haven't you, in
criminal cases~
"MR. ORRAN: Yes sir.
"THE COURT: And you have heard my
statement to the effect that the fact the defendant is charged by the information of the District
Attorney is no evidence of his guilt. Would you
treat Mr. Barlow with that legal proposition in
this matter~
"MR. ORRAN: I think I would.
"THE COURT: And the fact that he has
been charged you would not assume from that,
that that was any evidence of his guilt or that
he was guilty~
"MR. ORRAN: No.
"MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, the State
would resist the challenge that was made. Of
course we would leave it up to Your Honor but I
think in fairness I should state that.
"MR. HATCH: I should like to ask him one
more question.
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"THE COURT: You may.
"MR. HATCH: On what basis do you make
the statement 'That we had a girl working that
was in a similar position or condition' if you have
formed no opinion~
"MR. ORRAN: Well this girl's husband was
put in jail for that about two months ago.
"MR. HATCH: On the basis of that statement I will renew my motion to challenge for
cause.
"THE COURT: Mr. Ohran if you were in the
position of this defendant and the State of Utah
would you be willing to submit your case to eight
men like yourself~
"MR. ORRAN: I think I would.
"THE COURT: I don't think he shows any
impartiality" (R. 52-53).
The court denied the challenge by the words, "I
don't think he shows any impartiality" (R. 53). The challenge was n1ade not on the basis that the juror was
partial, prejudiced or biased, but on the basis he had
formed an opinion of the defendant's family situation
prior to trial, and that opinion was an opinion of guilt,
as evidenced by the following questions .and answers:
"MR. HATCH: On what basis do you make
the statement 'That we had a girl wori\:ing that
was in a similar position or condition' if you have
formed no opinion 1
"MR. ORRAN: Well this girl's husband was
put in jail for that about two months ago" (R. 53).
There.after the jury "~as impanelled after defendant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
had exhausted all his preemptory challenges, and Mr.
Ohran was a member of that jury.
Section 77-30-19(8), Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
states:
"A challenge for implied bias may be taken
for all or any of the following causes, and for
no other : * * *
"(8) Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to whether the defendant.
is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged."
The defendant contends that in the voir dire set
forth supra the juror, Ohran, showed an unqualified
opinion that the defendant was "in the same situation
as the husband of the girl working for him who had
been put in jail for that .about two months ago." While
the juror does not say in so many words that he is of the
opinion that the defendant is guilty, he indicates he has
a girl working for him in the same situation. The court
expresses the point at Record 53, line 27, where he states:
"I don't think he shows any impartiality," when the entire
substance and value of our system of trial by jury is
the selection of jurors who show an extreme degree of
impartiality.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NOS.
2 AND 5, AND IN FAILING TO DEFINE THE WORD, "COHABITATION," TO THE JURY. (Assignments Nos. 4, 5 and 6).

The court in instructing the jury as to the elements
and nature of the crime of unlawful cohabitation sets
forth in Instruction No. 2:
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"For the purpose of this c.ase unlawful cohabitation is defined as follows : If any person cohabits with more than one person of the opposite
sex such person is guilty of a felony" (R. 254),
and in Instruction No. 3, paragraph 1, uses the wording,
"did unlawfully cohabit with more than one person of
the opposite sex, to-wit: with two or more of the following," and then goes on in Instruction No. 5 with its only
attempt at definition of the word, "cohabit," wherein it
states:
"You are instructed that the gist of the
offense charged of unlawful cohabitation is
proved by facts showing a course of conduct,
upon the part of the defendant with more than
one person of the opposite sex, that to all outward
appearances convinces beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the parties are living together as husband
and wife, and that holding more than one woman
out to the world as his wife is sufficient to constitute the offense. And it is not a necessary element of such proof to show sexual intercourse, nor
actual attempted marriage, but such matters may
be considered by the jury in making a determination of the facts, if shown by the evidence.
"To be cohabitating it is not necessary that
the man actually dwell with the women, nor is it
necessary that he take his meals with her, nor
is it necessary that they be under the same roof, or
live in the same house, or that he see her a certain
number of days or nights, nor is cohabitation
proven by a nwre showing of isolated or
occasional acts of sexual 1nisconduct * * *"
The effect of these instructions is to purportedly
inform the jury of what unlawful cohabitation is, the
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court in Instruction No. 2 stating that the crime is
"any person who unlawfully cohabits with two or more
persons of the opposite sex." Then the court goes forward in defining unlawful cohabitation in a manner
which is entirely negative, which sets forth what is not
necessary to show unlawful cohabitation, but nowhere
defines the word, "cohabit," or "cohabitation," and
nowhere sets forth the affirmative elements, if any,
necessary to constitute cohabitation.
This court and the territorial court before it have
defined the word, "cohabit," in various ways, the number
of definitions being almost coextensive with the number
of illegal cohabitation actions before this court. The sum
and substance of the impression left from reading all
of these cases indicate "cohabit," as the legislature
intended its use in the statute on which the information
in this case arises, was meant to live together as man
and wife, or to ostensibly hold one of the opposite sex
out to the world as one's spouse.
The court in the case at bar states in Instruction
No. 5 (R. 256):
"And it is not a necessary element of such
proof to show sexual intercourse, nor actual attempted marriage, but such matters may be considered by the jury in making a determination of
the facts, if shown by the evidence.
"To be cohabitating it is not necessary that
the man actually dwell with the women, nor is
it necessary that he take his meals with her, nor
is it necessary that they be under the same roof,
or live in the same house, or that he see her a
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certain number of days or nights, nor is cohabitation proven by a mere showing of isolated or
occasional acts of sexual misconduct."
The portions of Instruction No. 5, together with Instruction No. 2, set forth to the jury what cohabitation
is not, but reading Instruction No.5 by itself and Instruction No. 2 by itself, or the instructions as a whole, it
is impossible to determine what unlawful cohabitation is,
and from what proof or evidence it may be found.
The court in Instruction No. 3, paragraph 1, which is
the first element of the crime, requires the jury to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Albert Edmund Barlow
did unlawfully cohabit with more than one person of the
opposite sex during the period charged, which constitutes
merely a rewording together with dates and the name
of the defendant of the language of the statute set forth
in Instruction No. 2. Instructions Nos. 6, 7 and 8 implicity set forth that the .act of a person in carrying
forward his legal and moral duty of caring for and
assisting in the upbringing and support of his children
does not constitute illegal cohabitation nor in itself evidence thereof.
Defendant contends, despite the language of State
vs. Barlow, 107 U. 292, 153 P(2) 6-!7, at page 651, citing
U. 8. vs. llfusser .and several other cohabitation cases
under tlw Ed1nunds Act, that the word, "cohabit," as used
in our statut(' is a technical word and not a word of general usage. It is a technieal word in that it was placed in
the statute and the f'tatnte was passed for the admitted
purpose of stamping out the practice of polygamy within
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the Territory and later the State. The trial court has
seen fit to define the word, "cohabit," rather than to
stand on the words of the statute, and in doing so gave
Instruction No. 5. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in
Martin vs. State, 289 P. 787, holds the definition of an
offense in a charge must inform the jury what facts are
necessary to justify a conviction. Instruction No. 5
merely tends to confuse the jury by stating what facts
are not necessary to show cohabitation.
The Supreme Court of Nevada in State vs. Green, 202
P. 368, states:
"Instructions should be so unequivocal that a
jury of laymen can experience no doubt as to their
significance."
The Supreme Court of Idaho in State vs. Wheeler,
220 P(2) 687, states:
"Instruction that is apt to confuse jury or requires an involved explanation and is ambiguous
should not be given."
We contend that the court having chosen to define
"cohabitation" and by doing so in a negative aspect
is bound by its instructions, and Instruction No. 5, together with Instruction No. 2, Instruction No. 3, paragraph 1, and Instructions Nos. 6, 7 .and 8, has so confused
the jury that the layman can experience nothing but
doubt as to the significance of the words, the facts and
the evidence necessary to prove them.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING IN EVIDENCE
TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS OUTSIDE THE PERIOD
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CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION, AND IN ALLOWING
TESTIMONY BASED ON HEARSAY AND CONCLUSIONS.
(Assignments of Error Nos. 2 and 3).

A.
The court erred in allowing in evidence testimony
and exhibits outside the period charged in the information. The information as amended charges defendant
with the crime of illegal cohabitation between the dates
of April 30, 1952, and October 31, 1955 (R. 21), and the
court in its Instruction No. 10 instructs the jury:
"You are instructed that the conduct of the
defendent and other persons showing his relationship, if any, to Kate Amanda Kilgrow,
Maurine Owen .and Vio Fraser, between the dates
set forth in the information is the onl:T evidence
that may be considered by you in this matter, and
evidence of cohabitation or lack thereof during
any other period is incompetent and immaterial,
and that unless you find the defendant to have cohabited with any two or more of the three women
set forth in the information betu·een the dates set
forth in the information, you must find the defendant not guilty."
Despite the limitation and the wording of Instruction No. 10, the court allowed in evidence over the objection of defendant the following docun1ents and testimony
relative to said docun1ents:
1. Exhibit 36, a school census card containing
alleged birth dates of nine children outside of the period
charged, this evidence being also secondary evidence
based on hearsay as discussed in Part B of this point
(R. 157-158), and duly objected to by defendant.
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2. Exhibits 37 and 38, school census cards containing information which is wholly outside of the period
charged in the information, the lastest date thereon being
April 20, 1952, also over the objection of defendant (R.
189).
3. Exhibit 39, medical records and testimony relative to said records (R. 204-205) over the objection of
defendant, although seven of the eight pages of this
exhibit refer to times and dates outside of the period
charged, and sheet number one of the exhibit is immaterial as to the defendant. Further, with the exception of
testimony reg.arding visits to children of the defendant by the defendant at 50 Granite Avenue, Exhibit 39,
together with Exhibits 37 and 38 (school census reports
discussed in 2 above), there is nothing in the record to
connect the defendant with Vio Fraser during the period
charged.
4. The court allowed Mrs. Annie Roll to testify with
reference to the wives of the defendant and conversations
relative thereto over the objection of the defendant (R.
161-163), and relating to times outside the period charged
in the information by sever.al years.
B.

The court admitted hearsay evidence and conclusion
evidence over the objections of the defendant that was
prejudicial to the defendant.
Despite the court's Instruction No. 10 and the objections of the defendant, the court allowed much evidence
consisting of hearsay and conclusions. While instances of
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such evidence run all through the record, the following
examples are outstanding:
1. At page 88 of the record and subsequent thereto,
the court allowed the witness, Shirley Broadbent, to
testify regarding a conversation with a child as to a
genealogical report and as to whom the child considered
its mother and father, despite the fact that the child
was born prior to B.arlow's incarceration in 1945 as
stipulated by counsel.
2. The court admitted Exhibit 15, the copy of a birth
certificate of a female child dated March 13, 1955, over
the objection of the defendant (R. 147-149), although
testimony of Doctor Andresen (R. 147-149) indicates that
information thereon as to the parents of the child
was obtained from a person or persons other than the
defendant. Quoting from the record:
"Q. At that time did you have occasion to
talk with the defendant concerning the paternity
and maternity of this .child~
"A. No. While waiting-"
3. The court allowed l\[rs. Arpin (R. 167-168) to
testify as to knowing the children from hearing their
mother call then1, and further to testify as to the name
of the mother from what she had heard the mother called
not in the presence of the defendant, .all over the objection of the defendant.

4. The court. over the objection of the defendant,
admitted Exhibit 36, a school census card (R. 157-158),
despite the fact that the infonnation thereon was ob-
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tained by a conversation with a person other than the
defendant and not in the defendant's presence:

"Q. Now did you have occasion to speak
with onyone at the home in order to obtain the
information contained on Exhibit 36 ~
"A. Well, I spoke to Mrs. Barlow.

"Q. And did you obtain the information contained on the card, Exhibit 36, from Mrs. Barolw~
"A. Yes.

"Q. And what was the first name of the Mrs.
Barlow to whom you spoke~
"A. Maurine.

"Q. And what information did you obtain
from her at that time~
"MR. HATCH: Objection as hearsay not in
the presence of the defendant, Your Honor.
"THE COURT: Well is it different than
what is on this card~

"Q. No. We will offer the card, Exhibit 36.
Now have you had opportunity to see it, Mr.
Hatch~

"MR. HATCH: I have had opportunity to see
it, yes.

"Q. We will offer Exhibit 36.
"MR. HATCH: I object to it as being hearsay, a matter obtained from .a person not the
defendant and put on the card.

"Q. We think, Your Honor" TI-lE COURT: May I see the

card~
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"Q. We think it is a fact as explained during
this mornings session "THE COURT : The objection will be overruled. It will be received in evidence.
"Q May it be shown to the jury, Your
Honor f That is all we have of this witness" (R.
157-158).
The above exhibits and testimony, which the defendant insists were improperly allowed to go to the jury,
were highly prejudicial, and had the effect of giving
to the jury for consideration facts which arose in some
cases years prior to the period charged in the information, which the jury could not help but consider with the
evidence submitted as to the defendant's association with
his children during the period charged, and thereby infer
a relationship with the women named in the information
which is in no way confirmed by the evidence.
The court further, by inconsistencies in its ruling as
to materiality of evidence arising from the linritation
dates set forth in the information, and in the court's
Instruction No. 10, confused the jury as to what it may
or may not consider. For example, on page 125 of the
record the court in the following language sustained defendant's objection to all the birth certificates prior to
the first date charged in the information:
"MR. HATCH: Your Honor, I must renew
my objections to its Inateriality. All of these birth
certificates whirh 1\fr. Anderson just handed me
are dates previous to the prior conviction in
this matter. I think that has already been determined and is immaterial to this case as not
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being in the period charged, or as evidence probative to the period charged.
"THE COURT: I think that objection is well
taken and I have that in mind on your other exhibit, Mr. Anderson, that any of those that are
prior to April 30th, 1952, at least, as to the birth
of the child named I believe are immaterial.
"MR. ANDERSON: Well we seek, Your
Honor, by proferring those, we have withdrawn
those which the evidence does not show were residing at the homes mentioned during the period
charged in the Information. We have done that.
We feel that with respect to the balance of the
birth certificates the evidence that these are the
children of these women and the evidence that
these children were living there that the birth
certificates are some evidence from which an
inference could be drawn that a relationship of
mother and child continued during the period in
question.
"THE COURT: Well as far as these exhibits
that you have just mentioned and those you had
this morning that I took under advisement I'm
going to sustain Mr. Hatch's objection to all of
those which bear a date of birth of the child
named therein earlier than April 30th, 1952. The
others I will still retain my ruling as a matter of
advisement to determine on this prima facie
showing that he seeks to make" (R. 125).
and then at page 189 of the record overrules defendant's
objections and admits documents referring to a date
earlier than April 30, 1952, thereby implying to the jury
that they may consider any and all evidence and nullifying the effect of all admonitions of the court striking
<: r!:,· te3timony or part of the record.
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POINT V.
THE EVIDENCE, IN VIEW OF THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS, IS INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW COHABITATION BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT AND ANY TWO OF
THE WOMEN NAMED IN THE INFORMATION DURING
THE PERIOD SET FORTH IN THE INFORMATION.
(Assignment of Error No. 8).

The relationship of father and child between the
defendant and the children shown in the evidence in
this case is admitted. The court in Instruction No. 6
(R. 257), Instruction No. 7 (R. 257), Instruction No. 8
(R. 257), and Instruction No. 9 (R. 258), instructed the
jury that neither the relationship between father and
children nor the efforts of the defendant to carry forth
the duties and obligations both legal and moral arising
from this relationship is any part of cohabitation, nor
in itself evidence thereof.
It has been stipulated that the defendant, Albert
Edmund Barlow, "·as convicted of illegal cohabitation
with the three women named in the instant information
in 1944, and was incarcerated for his crime in 1945. The
court instructed the jury in Instruction X o. 10 (discussed
supra) that the conduct of the defendant and others between the dates set forth in the inforn1ation is the only
evidence that n1ay be considered in this matter.
Considering the record as a whole, in view of these
instructions, there is little or no evidence showing a
course of conduct between the defendant and the w01nen
in the information or an~· of then1 on which the jury
could 1uake a finding of cohabitation, especially in view
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of the negative aspects of the court's attempted definition of the crime in Instructions Nos. 2 and 5.
True, there is abundant evidence of continual efforts
by the defendant to support and instruct his children, to
provide a place for them to live, but there is no evidence
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance that the defendant was cohabiting with two
or more of the women named in the information.
With regard to Amanda Kate Barlow, the testimony
of Bruce Andresen (R. 75-86), Shirley Broadbent (R. 8695), Alhona Barlow (R. 102-109), and David Barlow (R.
110-120), shows the defendant to have been frequently on
or ne.ar the premises at 44 West 6025 South, Murray,
Utah, and shows the children at that address to have
been the children of the defendant, but shows no connection whatsoever between Albert Edmund Barlow and
Amanda Kate Barlow who resided at that address during
all or any p,art of the period charged in the information.
The testimony of David Eccles (R. 95-101) shows
Mr. Barlow to have been interested in the house, which
was purchased by Wolrab, Inc., and that Amanda Kate
Barlow was the president of W olrab, Inc.
With respect to Maurine Owen and the premises at
1538 South 4th E.ast, the testimony of Evelyn Clampitt
(R. 126-145) shows the defendant to have been at the
home at 1538 South 4th East at infrequent intervals,
assisting in the repair of the premises and directing and
supervising the children, and on occasion eating there.
The only two times that the defendant is connected with
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Maurine Owen were, on one occasion when he rode with
them to the hospital (R. 129), and another occasion when
Mr. Barlow was called to the house due to the fact that
one of the children (a 13-year old boy) had broken or
injured his arm (R. 140).
Doctor Carl Andreasen testified (R. 146-150) as to
being present when the defendant was there at the time
of a birth, but testified he had no conversation with
the defendant (R. 147).
The testimony of Francis Stokes Zitting (R. 150152) showed no connection between the defendant and
Maurine Owen during the period charged. The testimony
of Annie Timms and Barbara J\icMillen (R. 152-158)
showed taking of school census reports, the admissibility
of which is discussed in a previous point in this brief
showing nine of the birthdates thereon to be outside of
the period charged. The testimony of Annie Roll (R.
159-166), Sarah Arpin (R. 166-170), Edmund Barlow
(R. 170-176), shows no connection between Maurine
Owen and the defendant during the period charged, ·with
the exception of visits by the defendant to 1538 South
4th East to look after the welfare and upbringing of
the children and occasional n1eals.
The testimony of Maurine Owen (R. 177 -187) is to
the effect that she was the mother of the children living
at that address and that Barlow had atte1npted to support the children although :Maurine was largely self-supporting-, that he called around to assist in the support
and upbringing of the children during the period charged,
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but showing no evidence of cohabitation during the period
charged other than support and upbringing of the children.
With respect to Vio Fraser, the testimony of Anna
Johnson (R. 187-188) and Ruth Johanson (R. 188-189),
shows a school census enumeration with all birthdates
being outside the dates charged in the information. The
testimony of Maxine Christensen (R. 189-191), Susan
Barlow (R. 191-194), and Vio Fraser (Barlow) (R. 194200), shows visitations by the defendant to 50 Granite
Avenue at intervals during the period charged for the
purposes of upkeep of the premises, providing support
for the children, but shows no connection between Vio
Fraser and the defendant for the period charged other
than support of children conceived and born prior to the
period charged.
The testimony of Betty Maack (R. 201-203), Frances
Willey (R. 203-205), and Virginia Wallgren (R. 206-207)
identifies certain hospital records discussed prior hereto
in this brief, all of which are outside the period charged.
The evidence of all the witnesses, together with the
evidence by defense witnesses, Herbert Maw (R. 214218) and Arlene Mitchell (R. 218-226) shows a continued
effort by the defendant to support the children conceived
and born outside the period with which defendant is
charged with cohabitation, but shows no evidence whatsoever of cohabitation between the defendant and any
of the three women, with the exception of birth of children to Maurine Owen as evidenced by EXhibit 15. However, the evidence is such that the admission of evidence
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outside the period charged and the period barred by the
statute of limitations makes it such that the defendant is
prejudiced by a jury's inability to ignore the admitted
three-family status of the defendant in years prior to the
period charged, and the defendant is convicted solely
upon his efforts to care for the children he was instrumental in bringing into this world prior to the period
charged in the information.
CONCLUSION
The defendant contends that it is apparent from a
review of the record and the discussion of Points 1 to 5,
covering nine assignments of error, that Albert Edmund
Barlow was convicted of an offense that is unconstitutional due to the ambiguous nature of the statute under
which he is charged, as discussed in Part A of Point 1;
also, that the defendant has been convicted of one and
possibly more of three crimes attempted to be charged in
one count, in definite 'iolation of Section 77-21-31, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953: that he was tried before a jury
containing one n1ember who b~T his own statements had a
preconceived opinion as to defendant's guilt: that the
jury wa~ instructed in such a n1anner that on reading the
instructions as a whole a la~7Jnan could haYe no idea of
what the eharge consisted of. and n1ust necessarily from
tlw language of the instructions be confused as to what
constitutes cohabitation, and therefore .as to what consti~
tutes illegal cohabitation: that the jur~T was further
allowed over objections of the defendant to hear evidence
aml to PxmninP documents whieh tended to show a
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relationship between the defendant and the women
charged in the information at times far removed from
the period of April 30, 1952, to October 31, 1955, and
were then instructed that the only evidence they could
consider was evidence within the period charged. They
were further instructed that evidence of a father-child
relationship and evidence of the father's attempts to
support, advise and contribute to the rearing of the
children was not in itself any indication of the relationship between the defendant and the mother of the children, testimony as to the father-child relationship constituting a great part of the entire record.
The defendant contends:
1. That he was convicted under an invalid statute.
2. That he was tried before a jury, a member of
which had expressed a preconceived opinion of the defendant's guilt not arising from the evidence.
3. That the defendant was tried on three crimes unlawfully charged under one information, and in a single
count, and that the verdict does not apprise the defendant
as to whether he was convicted of cohabitation with all
the women, with any two of the women, or with which
two of the women.
4. That the instructions read as a whole, and more
particularly those instructions discussed in Point 1-B,
Point 3 and Point 5 of this brief when considered as a
whole, as the jury was instructed to do, could only tend
to confuse the jury as to what proof or evidence was
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necessary to show cohabitation with any of the women
named in the information or with all of them.
5. That the jury was .allowed to hear and consider
evidence, both oral and documentary, which was so far
removed from the crime charged that it was immaterial;
that such evidence was prejudicial to defendant, tending
to show an unlawful relationship at a time other than the
time charged; that without such evidence there was no
evidence upon which the jury could determine a verdict
of guilt.
Defendant contends that if this court determines the
statute is unconstitutional as set forth in Point 1 of this
brief, the matter must be reversed and dis1nissed, and if
the court determines that the defendant was charged "ith
more than one crime, or was tried before a prejudiced
jury, or that the jury was not properly instructed, or
that the court allowed innnaterial and prejudicial evidence to be considered by the jury, that the matter
must be reversed and remanded for new trial with
instructions.
Respectfully submitted,
SUniNER J. HATCH
RAY S. ~IcCARTY
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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